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IN THE

# SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

..... TERM, 1966.

No. 469

ARCHIE J. LAYTON, ISAAC A. BYRD, JAMES W. BROWN and JOSEPH R. AINLEY, in Behalf of Themselves and a Committee for and in Behalf of All Other Persons of a Class Similarly Situated,
Petitioners,

vs.

SELB MANUFACTURING COMPANY, a Division of Western, Inc., a Corporation, and BLADES MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, a Corporation, and INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS DISTRICT NO. 9, a Labor Organization, Appellees,
Respondents.

## PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

**To the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.**

JEROME J. DUFF,
Suite 1155—818 Olive Street,
St. Louis, Missouri (63101),
314—MAin 1-3833,
Attorney for Petitioners.

ST. LOUIS LAW PRINTING CO., INC., 415 N. Eighth Street. CEntral 1-4477.

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Respondents.

## PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

**To the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.**

Archie J. Layton, Isaac A. Byrd, James W. Brown and Joseph R. Ainley, in Behalf of Themselves and a Committee for and in Behalf of All Other Persons of a Class Similarly situated, petitioners, pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, entered in the above-entitled case on May 2, 1966, and affirmed by Order denying Petitioners' petition for rehearing on May 25, 1966.

### OPINIONS BELOW.

The opinion of the District Court is reported in 236 Federal Supplement 451.

The opinion of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is reported in 359 F. 2d 715.

## JURISDICTION.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on May 2, 1966. The petitioners were denied rehearing on May 25, 1966. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under the Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646 (1), 62 Stat. 928 (1), 28 U. S. C., Sec. 1254 (1).

## QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

A. Can a labor organization settle by compromise, an arbitration award which has been upheld by a Mandate of a Circuit Court of Appeals when the membership involved has revoked settlement authority and the settlement is not in accord with the Mandate?

B. Can a Circuit Court of Appeals allow its Mandate to be rewritten in a document which substantially deviates from the provisions of the Mandate without first obtaining the Appellate Court's consent?

C. Can a District Court lawfully allow a judgment which has been affirmed by a Mandate of a Court of Appeals to be set aside and the cause of action dismissed by a Stipulation of the nominal parties thereto when one of the nominal parties is a labor organization acting contrary to the instructions of its affected membership by so stipulating and the terms and conditions of the dismissal in the Stipulation document are not disclosed to the Court or the labor organization members involved?

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The instant action commenced in the form of a motion by petitioners for an order granting relief to them under the provision of Rule 60 (b) (6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (R. 6 to 9). The petitioners are the Chief

Shop Steward and a majority of the elected Shop Stewards formerly in the employ of the respondent Selb Manufacturing Company (hereinafter designated the "company"). They ask for relief under the authority of Rule 60 (b) (6) and they invoke the provisions of Rule 71, F. R. C. P., as their authority to act in this case in behalf of their former fellow employees (R. 8).

The petitioners were employed by the Company during 1960 when a contract grievance arose between the petitioners and the Company. During all of the relevant times the petitioners were exclusively represented for purposes of collective bargaining by a labor organization known as District No. 9, International Association of Machinists (hereinafter designated the "Union"). The contract grievance eventually was taken into an arbitration procedure (S. R. 2 to 6) and the Union prevailed in a landmark arbitration decision. The Company refused to abide by the Arbitrator's decision and the Union filed a suit in the District Court for specific performance of the Award (S. R. 1 to 7).

The District Court affirmed the Union and the Arbitrator. The Company appealed and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court (305 F. 2d 177).

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Mandate was lodged on Aug. 30, 1962 (R. 3). On September 24, 1962, the Union membership held a meeting in order to discuss their status in the litigation. Following that meeting a telegram was sent on September 24th, 1962, by A. J. Layton, Chief Steward, in behalf of all of the Grievants, to the Union requesting the settlement negotiations to "STOP" until the membership could re-schedule a meeting to discuss the case (R. 11). This telegram was received in due course by Union Officers (R. 34). However, no such meeting was ever scheduled and the Union entered into an unauthorized settlement of the litigation with the Com-

pany on October 11th, 1962 (R. 10). Also on October 11th, 1962, the Company and Union Officials executed two documents. One document is titled a "Stipulation" and was filed with the District Court on October 11th, 1962 (R. 10). The other document signed on October 11th, 1962 is titled "Agreement" (S. R. 35, 36, 37, 38 and 39). The document titled "Agreement" was NEVER filed with the district court. It was NEVER disclosed to the district court. It was NEVER exhibited to or disclosed to the members of the Union (R. 67, 70, 72). The "Agreement" document deviates in every respect from the Mandate of the Appellate Court.

On March 30th, 1963, the Union finally called a meeting of the members (S. R. 39 to 57), to seek approval of the settlement proposition (five months and three weeks AFTER the Union had stipulated with the Company and set aside the judgment and dismissed the litigation without the knowledge or consent of the members). In the course of this meeting the membership consented to a settlement totalling $125,000.00 (S. R. 57). The members were still NOT told of the "Agreement" made between the Company and the Union (R. 67, 70, 72). In June, 1963, checks in varying amounts were mailed to the majority of the Grievants, endorsed and negotiated (S. R. 58 to 61). Each check contained a release above the endorsement line (S. R. 61). The petitioners' motion for relief under the provisions of Rule 60 (b) (6) was filed twenty months afterward (R. 6).

## REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.

Petitioners have only the power of this Court left to them to compel the District Court below to re-examine and re-evaluate the grounds and procedural errors which led up to the loss of their valuable rights as spelled out by the Mandate of the Court of Appeals. Petitioners re-

adopt and re-urge the arguments set out in their Petition for Re-Hearing in the Court of Appeals below as the reasons why this Court must grant its curative Writ.

Compelling the District Court below to thoroughly re-examine the setting aside of the Mandate as petitioners prayed in their Rule 60 motion (R. 8), will avoid prolonged and needless litigation to test the validity of the dismissal and releases under the teaching of Elgin J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 65 S. Ct. 1282 and 66 S. Ct. 86. Compelling compliance with the rigid requirements of the teachings of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in their cases of Hartman v. Lauchli, 304 F. 2d 431 and Thornton v. Carter, 109 F. 2d 316, will forever prevent the type of miscarriage of justice so rampant in this record.

## CONCLUSION.

For the foregoing reasons, the Writ of Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

JEROME J. DUFF,
Attorney for Petitioners,
Suite 1155—818 Olive Street,
St. Louis, Missouri 63101,
314—MAin 1-3833.

## Affidavit of Service.

State of Missouri,
City of St. Louis.

I, Jerome J. Duff, counsel for the Petitioners herein, and an attorney of record for the Petitioners in the Courts below, depose that on the .. day of August, 1966, I served four copies of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari on the Respondents, as required by Rule 33, Para-

graph 1, by personally delivering said copies hereof to Mr. Bernard Barken, Attorney of Record for Respondent Selb-Blades, etc., 611 Olive Street, St. Louis, Missouri, and Messrs. Bartley, Siegel & Bartley, Attorneys for Respondent Union, 130 South Bemiston Avenue, Clayton, Missouri 63105.

.....

Jerome J. Duff.

Subscribed and sworn to before me at St. Louis, Missouri, on this .. day of August, 1966.

.....

Notary Public.

My Commission Expires: .....

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Petitioners,

vs.

SELB MANUFACTURING COMPANY, a Division of Western, Inc., a Corporation, and BLADES MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, a Corporation, and INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS DISTRICT NO. 9, a Labor Organization, Appellees,
Respondents.

## APPENDIX "A"

**To Petitioners' Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.**

JEROME J. DUFF,
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## APPENDIX "A"

**To Petitioners' Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.**

### OPINION, EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS RENDERED MAY 2, 1966.

Before Vogel, Chief Judge, Blackmun, Circuit Judge, and Stephenson, District Judge.

Stephenson, District Judge.

This is an appeal from the District Court's order[1] denying appellants' motion[2] seeking to enforce a previous judg-

[1] Layton v. Selb Mfg. Co., 244 F. Supp. 178 (E. D. Mo. 1965).

[2] The appellants' motion was made pursuant to the provision of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60 (b) (6) which provides:

"On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: • • • (6)

ment which had been set aside and the cause therein dismissed by the District Court upon stipulation of the parties after said judgment had been affirmed by this Court.

An arbitration award ordering Selb Manufacturing Company and Blades Manufacturing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Appellee-Company) to rehire certain employees, to make these employees whole financially, and to return certain equipment and work to St. Louis was obtained on January 5, 1961, by the International Association of Machinists, District No. 9 (hereinafter referred to as Appellee-Union). On February 10, 1961, the Appellee-Union and the Appellee-Company entered into a stipulation providing for the procedure to be followed if and when the Federal District Court ordered specific enforcement of the arbitration award.[3]

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any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as provided in Title 28, U. S. C., § 1655, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action."

[3] The stipulation on subsequent procedure entered into by the Appellee-Union and the Appellee-Company was as follows:

"In the event the Court enters its order decreeing specific performance of the Arbitration Award then, and in the event that no appeal is taken, the parties shall attempt to reach agreement on what specifically the defendants must do in order to comply with the aforesaid Arbitration Award. In the event that the parties are unable to reach agreement within thirty days after expiration of the period permitted for appeal, or such additional time as the parties may agree upon, then on application by either party the Court shall appoint a commissioner to implement compliance with the Award.

In the event that either party hereto appeals the finding and order of this Court and/or any appellate court with respect to

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri entered an order on December 27, 1961, compelling specific performance of the arbitration award and further noted that "this Court will retain jurisdiction of this cause for the purpose of carrying out the Stipulation on Subsequent Procedure filed by the parties herein." The judgment of the District Court was affirmed on July 6, 1962. Selb Mfg. Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 305 F. 2d 177 (8th Cir. 1962). In affirming the District Court's judgment this Court, after observing that a stipulation between the parties had been filed, noted that, if necessary, the District Court could deal with any controversies concerning the stipulation of the parties relating to implementation of the award. After this Court issued its mandate on August 29, 1962, settlement negotiations between the Appellee-Union and Appellee-Company resulted in a $125,000 payment to the Union in satisfaction of the Union claims and demands giving rise to the arbitration award.[4] The document embodying this agreement included a paragraph stating that "the Company will take whatever steps are necessary to withdraw further prosecution of its appeal and application for certiorari, and the Union will dismiss with prejudice at the cost of the Company Cause No. 61 C 20 (1) now pending in the District Court of the Eastern Judicial District of Missouri." A stipulation by the parties setting aside the District Court's judgment of December 27, 1961, and dismissing the cause involved therein with prejudice to the plaintiff was filed

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whether or not defendants must comply with the arbitration award, the further tseps mentioned above shall be held in abeyance pending disposition of said appellate procedure. If it is finally determined, on appeal, that defendants must comply, then the aforesaid procedure shall be followed."

[4] After discussion and action taken at two union meetings, Appellee-Union made distribution of the settlement to its members, including named appellants, who received and endorsed individual checks acknowledging full and complete settlement and satisfaction of their respective claims and a release of appellees. 244 F. Supp. at 179-180.

and granted by the District Court on October 11, 1962. Thereafter, on March 15, 1965, the appellants herein, who have been designated as the Chief Shop Steward and a majority of the duly elected Shop Stewards of the employees of the Appellee-Company[5] filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (b) (6) and sought, inter alia, to set aside the stipulation of October 11, 1962, and to secure the appointment of a Commissioner to enforce the original District Court judgment which was affirmed by this Court on July 6, 1962. The appellants' request for relief was denied by the District Court.

The sole ground relied upon by the appellants for reversal in this appeal is that the District Court erred in allowing a judgment which had been affirmed by an issued mandate of the Court of Appeals to be set aside and the cause of action dismissed without the permission or approval of the appellate court. The appellants have cited two cases in support of their position—Hartman v. Lauchli, 304 F. 2d 431 (8th Cir. 1962) and Thornton v. Carter, 109 F. 2d 316 (8th Cir. 1940).

While it is true that the cases cited by the appellants support the proposition that a District Court does not have the authority to alter or deviate from a mandate of the Court of Appeals without first obtaining the appellate court's consent, the legal principle involved has no application whatsoever to the facts of this case. As previously mentioned in the chronological description of the events which eventually culminated in the instant appeal, this Court specifically noted that the District Court re-

[5] The appellants assert that their right to bring this action derives from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71 which provides that "[w]hen an order is made in favor of a person who is not a party to the action, he may enforce obedience to the order by the same process as if he were a party; and, when obedience to an order may be lawfully enforced against a person who is not a party, he is liable to the same process for enforcing obedience to the order as if he were a party."

tained jurisdiction of the case for the purpose of carrying out the Stipulation of Subsequent Procedure filed by the parties. After remand of the case, the Appellee-Union and the Appellee-Company entered into a settlement agreement. The fact that the District Court then, upon the request of the parties to the action, dismissed the cause of action with prejudice to the plaintiff in no manner disturbed the mandate of this Court. It is obvious that in affirming the District Court's judgment, this Court recognized the possibility of such a settlement when it stated that "any controversy over backpay allowances can, if necessary, be dealt with by the District Court in accordance with the stipulation of the parties relating to implementation of the award." Selb Mfg. Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, supra, 305 F. 2d at 179 (emphasis added). It is abundantly clear that the District Court in approving the stipulation dismissing the case acted in conformance with the mandate of this Court. The appeal herein is wholly without merit.

Both appellees herein assert that the appellants' appeal is frivolous and ask for damages and costs pursuant to 28 U. S. C., § 1912. The Court agrees that the facts of this case render the instant appeal frivolous and that damages should be assessed.[6] Any costs the appellees incurred in connection with the printing of the Record or the Joint Supplemental Record and the cost of printing appellees' briefs which were necessitated by this appeal are hereby assessed against the appellants. These amounts are to be shown by appellees' affidavits filed with the Clerk of this Court. In addition, Appellee-Company and Appellee-Union

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[6] See, Lowe v. Willacy, 239 F. 2d 179, 16 Alaska 499 (9th Cir. 1956); Ginsburg v. Stern, 295 F. 2d 698 (3d Cir. 1961); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Eiler, 126 F. 2d 429 (8th Cir. 1942); Compare Honebein v. McDonald, 299 F. 2d 493, 496 (8th Cir. 1962); Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Davis, 277 F. 2d 765, 772 (8th Cir. 1960); Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Feutz, 182 F. 2d 752, 758-759 (8th Cir. 1950).

are awarded $500 each for counsel fees incurred in the appeal. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed and the Clerk of this Court is directed to enter the award of damages upon the showing of appellees' affidavits.

**ORDER AND JUDGMENT, 8th C. C. A., ENTERED MAY 17, 1966.**

This cause came on to be heard on the record from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, and was argued by counsel.

On Consideration Whereof, it is now Ordered and Adjudged by this Court that the Judgment of the said District Court appealed from this cause be, and the same is hereby affirmed.

And it is Further Ordered by this Court that the appellees, Selb Manufacturing Company, and Blades Manufacturing Corporation, have and recover against appellants, Archie J. Layton, Isaac A. Byrd, James W. Brown, and Joseph R. Ainley, in behalf of themselves and as a Committee for and in behalf of all other persons of a Class similarly situated, the sum of One Hundred Seventy-One and 50/100 ($171.50) Dollars, being one-half of the cost of printing thirty copies of the supplemental record of Appellees, and the sum of One Hundred Sixty-One and 20/100 ($161.20) Dollars for printing of brief of said appellees, and also the sum of Five Hundred Dollars to be awarded to counsel for said appellees-companies as attorneys' fees, making a total of Eight Hundred Thirty-Two and 70/100 ($832.70) Dollars to be taxed and certified down on the mandate for collection in the District Court.

And it is Further Ordered by this Court that the appellees, International Association of Machinists, District 9, have and recover against appellants, Archie J. Layton, Isaac A. Byrd, James W. Brown and Joseph R. Ainley,

in behalf of themselves and as a Committee for and in behalf of all other persons of a Class similarly situated, the sum of One Hundred Seventy-one and 51/100 ($171.51) Dollars, being one-half of the cost of printing thirty copies of the Supplemental record of appellees, and the sum of One Hundred Thirty-eight and 91/100 ($138.91) Dollars for printing of brief of said appellee, and also the sum of Five Hundred Dollars to be awarded to counsel for said appellee-Union as Attorneys' fees, making a total of Eight Hundred Ten and 41/100 ($810.41) Dollars to be taxed and certified down on the mandate for collection in the District Court.

May 17, 1966.

Ordered entered in accordance with opinion.

Clerk, U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

**ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING ENTERED MAY 25, 1966.**

Before Vogel, Chief Judge, Blackmun, Circuit Judge, and Stephenson, District Judge.

Stephenson, District Judge.

Appellants' petition for rehearing and for consideration by the Court en banc is denied.

May 25, 1966.

Order entered at direction.

Clerk, U. S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

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Respondents.

## BRIEF

**Of Respondent, International Association of Machinists, District No. 9 in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari.**

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Respondents.

## BRIEF

**Of Respondent, International Association of Machinists, District No. 9 in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari.**

This cause should not be reviewed by this Court because none of the considerations set forth in Rule 19 is present in this case. Not only is there a complete absence of any special or important reason for granting certiorari, but the appeal is, as the Court of Appeals specifically ruled, frivolous. Inasmuch as Petitioners failed to comply with Rule 23, par. 1 (a) and (i), we are herewith attaching as Appendix "A" a copy of the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit handed down on May 2, 1966.

## QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

The questions which Petitioners contend are presented in this case were not presented to nor decided by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, nor are those questions grounded on facts set forth in the record of this case. The questions Petitioners argue are here presented are, in fact, completely at variance with and contrary to the actual facts as shown by the record herein.

Petitioners in framing said questions rely on two propositions, namely, that the compromise settlement of the arbitration award was contrary to the mandate of the Court of Appeals, and second, that the membership involved had revoked the authority of Respondent Union to enter into such settlement agreement. Both propositions are completely at variance with the facts in this case. In order to demonstrate this, and because Petitioners' Statement of the Case is inadequate and incomplete, Respondent Union is compelled to make its own Statement of the Case.

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

For convenience, Respondents Selb Manufacturing Company and Blades Manufacturing Corporation will be referred to herein as Respondent-Company and Respondent International Association of Machinists, District Number 9 will be referred to as Respondent-Union.[1]

Respondent-Union was the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all production, maintenance and machine shop employees (including Petitioners herein) of Respondent-Company (S. R. 2, 8). A grievance was filed by Respondent-Union which ultimately led to an Arbitration

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[1] In addition to Petitioners' Record in the Court of Appeals, Respondents filed a Supplemental Record. Therefore, reference to Petitioners' Record is made as (R.) Reference to Respondents' Supplemental Record is made as (S. R.).

Award which ordered Respondent-Company to rehire employees laid off after a certain date, make them whole financially and return machinery and equipment from where they had been shipped to St. Louis.

After the Arbitration Award became final, but was not complied with by the Respondent-Company, Respondent-Union filed suit under Section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C., Section 185, for specific performance of said Award (S. R. 1-7). On December 27, 1961, the District Court entered its conclusions of law that the grievance in question was submitted by Respondent-Union and Respondent-Company to arbitration under their contract, and the Arbitration Award became final and binding upon Respondent-Union and Respondent-Company. The District Court then entered its Decree compelling specific performance of the Arbitration Award, and specifically retained jurisdiction for the purpose of carrying out a Stipulation on Subsequent Procedure entered in by the Parties (S. R. 31, 32).

The Stipulation on Subsequent Procedure was entered into because the Arbitration Award did not declare the names of the employees who were entitled to be reinstated, how much money each such employee was entitled to receive, what machinery and work were to be returned to St. Louis, and because the parties recognized that further proceedings would have to be had in order to determine the foregoing, so that a final judgment on which an execution could issue could be entered (R. 31).

The Stipulation on Subsequent Procedure (S. R. 29, 30) provided as follows:

> "In the event the Court enters its order decreeing specific performance of the Arbitration Award then, and in the event that no appeal is taken, the parties shall attempt to reach agreement on what specifically

the defendants must do in order to comply with the aforesaid Arbitration Award. In the event that the parties are unable to reach agreement within thirty days after expiration of the period permitted for appeal, or such additional time as the parties may agree upon, then on application by either party the Court shall appoint a commissioner to implement compliance with the Award.

In the event that either party hereto appeals the finding and order of this Court and/or any appellate court with respect to whether or not defendants must comply with the arbitration award, the further steps mentioned above shall be held in abeyance pending disposition of said appellate procedure. If it is finally determined, on appeal, that defendants must comply, then the aforesaid procedure shall be followed."

On July 6, 1962, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decree of the District Court, and stated that the District Court retained jurisdiction for further proceedings. (**Selb Manufacturing Company v. International Association of Machinists, District 9**, 305 F. 2d 177). On August 29, 1962, the Court of Appeals issued its mandate.

After the decision of the Court of Appeals was handed down, Respondent-Union (as Plaintiff) and Respondent-Company (as Defendant) engaged in negotiations, looking towards a possible settlement of the case (R. 28). After consideration and rejection of a number of proposals made by the Company, the Respondent-Union decided to accept in settlement the sum of One Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($125,000.00), plus certain re-employment rights (as set forth in the Settlement Agreement of October 11, 1962, Defendants' Exhibit A-1, S. R. 35-39) (S. R. 41).

A meeting of the employees of the Company was held on September 22, 1962, at which Petitioners herein were present. (S. R. 40-42, 53, 68, 71). The employees were advised that Respondent-Union had authorized its attorneys to settle the pending litigation for the total amount of One Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($125,000.00) (S. R. 41, R. 54, 55), and then the membership voted that District No. 9, rather than a committee of its members, should process the claims of the employees to determine what portion or amount of the settlement should be received by each of those persons eligible to share in the settlement (R. 28, 35; S. R. 41, 50, 51).

After the September 22, 1962, meeting, Respondent-Union, acting pursuant to the authorization given it by the membership and the District Board (R. 42), entered into the Settlement Agreement and Stipulation (S. R. 35-39). Pursuant to this Agreement the Respondent-Company paid Respondent-Union One Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($125,000.00), which the Union accepted "on its behalf and on behalf of its members in full and complete satisfaction and settlement of all claims, demands, actions, causes of action and judgment. . . ." The agreement further provided that under certain conditions the Company would be required to re-open a plant in St. Louis, and that in any event, if the Company re-opened any plant within the Union's jurisdictional area it would recall the employees in question (S. R. 37, 38).

Upon receipt of the aforesaid One Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($125,000.00), Respondent-Union began processing the claims of the individual members. In the course of processing these claims to determine the amount each eligible employee was entitled to receive, the Union sent at least four letters to the employees requesting information relative to their employment in

order to determine their eligibility and the amount of their respective claims to the settlement proceeds (S. R. 42-46). The processing of these claims was interrupted because of a protest filed **by Petitioner Layton**, and as a result of **his** objections, another meeting of the Union membership was called and took place on March 30, 1963 (S. R. 39, 40).

At the March 30, 1963, meeting, the officers and counsel of Respondent-Union explained in detail that the aforesaid settlement of the case had been made with the Company, but that any one of the members could file a suit to set aside the settlement. The Union officers and counsel made it perfectly clear that none of the funds received in settlement of the litigation would be disbursed, unless everyone present agreed to the settlement and indicated by his vote that he did not intend to file a suit to contest the settlement (S. R. 48-50, 53, 54, 56).

All of the Petitioners were present at this second meeting and took an active part, particularly Petitioner Layton, who spoke at length and stated he had checked the settlement thoroughly with his committee and that "we do not plan suit" (S. R. 52). Petitioner Layton also testified in a hearing before the District Court that he had engaged a law firm in February of 1963, to check the court records, and said law firm showed copies of the court records to Layton (R. 52, 53).

During the discussion of the motion at the March 30, 1963, meeting, as to whether to approve the aforesaid settlement that had been made between the Company and the Union, Petitioner Layton asked whether the vote was to be an approval of the entire settlement, or just of the money portion (S. R. 55). It was explained to him and the membership that the proposal they were voting on was whether to approve a settlement of the entire

case, not just the money, but jobs and everything (S. R. 55, 56).

At the conclusion of the discussion, the Union membership, without objection or a dissenting vote from anyone, including the four Petitioners, unanimously approved and ratified the settlement (S. R. 57).

On June 14, 1963, pursuant to the approval and ratification of the settlement by the membership, and after determining the persons eligible to share in the settlement proceeds and the amount to which each such employee was entitled, as it had been authorized to do by the membership, the Union sent out letters to the employees entitled to share in the proceeds of the settlement, each of which letters contained the following statement (R. 12):

> "Enclosed please find check in the amount of $....., which represents payment in full of your claim against Selb Manufacturing Company and Blades Manufacturing Corporation pursuant to the Settlement Agreement entered into in the case of **I. A. of M. District 9 versus Selb Manufacturing Company and Blades Manufacturing Corporation**, No. 61 C 20 (1), in the United States District Court for the Eastern Judicial District of Missouri, Eastern Division . . ."

Enclosed with each letter was a check to the respective employees, including Petitioners herein (S. R. 58).

On the back of each of the checks there was the following stamped release (S. R. 61):

> "Endorsement constitutes full and complete satisfaction and settlement of my claims arising out of Cause No. 61 C 20 (1), in the U. S. District Court for the Eastern Judicial District of Missouri, Eastern Division, styled **International Association of Machinists, District 9 versus Selb Manufacturing Company**

et al., and a full and complete Release of the above mentioned parties, the I. A. of M. District 9 Welfare Association and their officers, agents and employees."

Each of the above checks received by the Petitioners was endorsed by them below the stamped release. At the hearing on the Motion, each of them admitted endorsing the check and receiving the money (R. 57, 69, 71, 74).

On March 15, 1965, after a lapse of almost two and one-half years, Petitioners filed their Motion under Rule 60 (b) (6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to set aside the order of the District Court dismissing this case pursuant to the settlement previously made. The District Court afforded Petitioners a full hearing on their Motion.

## DISTRICT COURT FINDINGS.

Based upon the foregoing facts, the District Court overruled Petitioners' Motion herein, and, in addition to finding essentially the foregoing facts (R. 79), found that the Petitioners had full and complete knowledge of the settlement; that the Union that brought the arbitration was responsible for obtaining the relief and was the proper representative of all of the employees (R. 82); that the Union and Company had the right to settle the litigation without leave of the Court of Appeals (R. 83) and that, in any event, the facts showed clearly that the Petitioners had full knowledge of the settlement made by the Union, and they were barred from proceeding by acceptance of the money and the signing of the releases (R. 84).

## COURT OF APPEALS FINDINGS.

In affirming the District Court, the Court of Appeals noted that the sole ground relied upon by Petitioners in their appeal was that the District Court erred in allowing a judgment which had been affirmed to be set aside

and dismissed without permission or approval of the Appellate Court contrary to the holdings in its cases of **Hartman v. Lauchli,** 304 F. 2d 431 (8th Cir. 1962) and **Thornton v. Carter,** 109 F. 2d 316 (8th Cir. 1940). In disposing of this contention, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the legal principle involved in those cases had no application whatsoever to the facts in this case. The Court of Appeals specifically pointed out that the District Court retained jurisdiction for the purpose of carrying out the Stipulation on Subsequent Procedure, and that it had obviously recognized the possibility of a settlement when it stated in its affirming opinion that "any controversy over backpay allowances can, **if necessary,** be dealt with by the District Court in accordance with the Stipulation of the parties relating to implementation of the award."

Thus, the Court of Appeals, in interpreting its own mandate, found that the parties did **not** violate its mandate. The Court of Appeals rejected the sole ground raised by Petitioners, stating (Appendix A, page 19):

> "It is abundantly clear that the District Court in approving the stipulation dismissing the case acted in conformance with the mandate of this Court. The appeal herein is wholly without merit."

In addition to holding Petitioners' appeal to be wholly without merit, the Court of Appeals found that, under the facts, the Petitioners' appeal was frivolous and assessed damages against them.

## ARGUMENT AGAINST GRANTING CERTIORARI

Petitioners advance no argument or reason in support of their Petition for a Writ of Certiorari other than referring this Court to arguments they made in their Petition for Re-Hearing filed in and overruled by the Court of Appeals. Therefore, looking to that document in an

effort to glean their position and answer the same, we find no reasons advanced therein of such moment to compel this Court to grant certiorari, and certainly, none of the considerations set forth in Supreme Court Rule 19 is present here. All that Petitioners seem to be urging is that the Court of Appeals does not understand what it stated in its own opinion.

Respondent-Union submits that the record herein does not reflect any persuasive reason why the Court should grant certiorari.

First of all, the questions which Petitioners say are present here are not present at all. The principal reason for this is that the questions, as posed, assume facts which are not contained in the record. Specifically, Question "A" states that the "membership involved his revoked the settlement authority." A cursory reading of Respondent's Statement of the Case and the record demonstrates that this statement is wholly inaccurate. Respondent-Union felt constrained to make a rather detailed Statement of the Case in order to show clearly the error of this assertion. It is crystal clear from the record that not only did the membership approve the settlement and ratify the same with full knowledge of its terms, but also, that they accepted the fruits thereof and enjoyed the same for almost two and one-half years before Petitioners filed their Motion under 60 (b) (6) which initiated these proceedings. These facts were found by the District Court, the Court of Appeals affirmed, and hence it is clear that nothing is presented by Question "A."

Question "B" also poses an issue which is not involved herein where it is claimed that the mandate of the Court of Appeals was changed without its consent.

Petitioners seem to contend that the opinion of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is in conflict with its

own cases of **Hartman v. Lauchli**, 304 F. 2d 431 (8th Cir. 1962) and **Thornton v. Carter**, 109 F. 2d 316 (8th Cir. 1940). If this is their position, it is obvious that such a position is not well founded, since both of these cases are factually different from the present case. Stated as an abstract rule, Petitioners correctly contend that the mandate of an appellate court cannot be altered or changed without the permission of that court. However, that rule has no meaning here, simply because the present fact situation does not warrant its application.

The Court of Appeals so found when it held at page 4 (Appendix A, pages 18-19) of its opinion:

> "While it is true that the cases cited by the appellants support the proposition that a District Court does not have the authority to alter or deviate from a mandate of the Court of Appeals without first obtaining the appellate court's consent, the legal principle involved has no application whatsoever to the facts of this case.
>
> "As previously mentioned in the chronological description of the event which eventually culminated in the instant appeal, this Court specifically noted that the District Court retained jurisdiction of the case for the purpose of carrying out the Stipulation of Subsequent Procedure filed by the parties. After remand of the case, the Appellee-Union and the Appellee-Company entered into a settlement agreement. The fact that the District Court then, upon the request of the parties to the action, dismissed the cause of action with prejudice to the plaintiff in no manner disturbed the mandate of this Court. It is obvious that in affirming the District Court's judgment, this Court recognized the possibility of such a settlement when it stated that 'any controversy over backpay allowances can, **if necessary**, be dealt with by the

District Court in accordance with the stipulation of the parties relating to implementation of the award.' **Selb Manufacturing Company v. International Association of Machinists,** supra at 179. It is abundantly clear that the District Court in approving the stipulation dismissing the case acted in conformance with the mandate of this Court. The appeal herein is wholly without merit."

The last Question "C" claimed to be present in this case is likewise not present, since it appears to be little more than a re-phrasing of Question "A," and also contrary to the facts.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the questions posed by Petitioners are not relevant here, since they are based upon non-existent facts that are not contained in the record. Hence nothing is presented by them for this Court to decide.

In addition, a search of the record does not disclose any factual, legal or procedural error requiring the Court to grant certiorari. Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that there are issues present of sufficient importance to be decided by this Court. No conflict in opinions by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit with any other Circuit Court of Appeals, its own or of this Court, has been pointed out.

Respondent-Union submits that the judgment of the Court of Appeals was manifestly correct. There also exist a number of meritorious defenses that bar Petitioners from relief in any event. These are based on lack of capacity, estoppel, untimeliness of Petitioners' Motion and others which clearly demonstrate that the decision of the Court of Appeals was for the right parties. Petitioners were afforded a full and fair hearing in the District Court. Their only argument appears to be that the Court of Appeals has misinterpreted its own mandate.

That Court has, however, made it perfectly clear that everything done by the Parties was not only not contrary to its mandate, but also well within what that Court intended and contemplated would be done. In short, Petitioners' appeal herein is, as the Court of Appeals found, "wholly without merit."

Petitioners have advanced no reasons of any substance nor anything approaching the criteria which Supreme Court Rule 19 states will be considered for granting review on certiorari.

## CONCLUSION.

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

BARTLEY, SIEGEL & BARTLEY,

By.....
MALCOLM L. BARTLEY,

.....
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.....
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## APPENDIX A.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit.

No. 18,168

Archie J. Layton, Isaac A. Byrd, James W. Brown, and Joseph R. Ainley, In Behalf of Themselves and as a Committee for and in Behalf of All Other Persons of a Class Similarly Situated,
Appellants,

vs.

Selb Manufacturing Company, a Division of Western, Inc., a Corporation, and Blades Manufacturing Corporation, a Corporation, International Association of Machinists, District 9,
Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.

[May 2, 1966.]

Before Vogel, Chief Judge, Blackmun, Circuit Judge, and Stephenson, District Judge.

Stephenson, District Judge.

This is an appeal from the District Court's order[1] denying appellants' motion[2] seeking to enforce a previous

[1] **Layton v. Selb Mfg. Co.**, 244 F. Supp. 178 (E. D. Mo. 1965).

[2] The appellants' motion was made pursuant to the provision of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60 (b) (6) which provides:

"On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final order,

judgment which had been set aside and the cause therein dismissed by the District Court upon stipulation of the parties after said judgment had been affirmed by this Court.

An arbitration award ordering Selb Manufacturing Company and Blades Manufacturing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Appellee-Company) to rehire certain employees, to make these employees whole financially, and to return certain equipment and work to St. Louis was obtained on January 5, 1961, by the International Association of Machinists, District No. 9 (hereinafter referred to as Appellee-Union). On February 10, 1961, the Appellee-Union and the Appellee-Company entered into a stipulation providing for the procedure to be followed if and when the Federal District Court ordered specific enforcement of the arbitration award.[3]

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judgment or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this sub-division (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as provided in Title 28, U. S. C., 1655, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action."

[3] The stipulation on subsequent procedure entered into by the Appellee-Union and the Appellee-Company was as follows:

"In the event the Court enters its order decreeing specific performance of the Arbitration Award then, and in the event that no appeal is taken, the parties shall attempt to reach agreement on what specifically the defendants must do in order to comply with the aforesaid Arbitration Award. In the event that the parties are unable to reach agreement within thirty days after expiration of the period permitted for appeal, or such additional time as the parties may agree upon, then on

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri entered an order on December 27, 1961, compelling specific performance of the arbitration award and further noted that "this Court will retain jurisdiction of this cause for the purpose of carrying out the Stipulation on Subsequent Procedure filed by the parties herein." The judgment of the District Court was affirmed on July 6, 1962. **Selb Mfg. Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists**, 305 F. 2d 177 (8th Cir. 1962). In affirming the District Court's judgment this Court, after observing that a stipulation between the parties had been filed, noted that, if necessary, the District Court could deal with any controversies concerning the stipulation of the parties relating to implementation of the award. After this Court issued its mandate on August 29, 1962, settlement negotiations between the Appellee-Union and Appellee-Company resulted in a $125,000 payment to the Union in satisfaction of the Union claims and demands giving rise to the arbitration award.[4] The document embodying this agreement included a paragraph stating that "the Company will take whatever steps are necessary to withdraw further prosecution of its appeal and application for certiorari, and the Union will dismiss with prejudice at the cost of the Company Cause No. 61 C 20 (1) now pending in the

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application by either party the Court shall appoint a commissioner to implement compliance with the Award.

In the event that either party hereto appeals the finding and order of this Court and/or any appellate court with respect to whether or not defendants must comply with the arbitration award, the further steps mentioned above shall be held in abeyance pending disposition of said appellate procedure. If it is finally determined, on appeal, that defendants must comply, then the aforesaid procedure shall be followed."

[4] After discussion and action taken at two union meetings, Appellee-Union made distribution of the settlement to its members, including named appellants, who received and endorsed individual checks acknowledging full and complete settlement and satisfaction of their respective claims and a release of appellees. 244 F. Supp. at 179-80.

District Court of the Eastern Judicial District of Missouri." A stipulation by the parties setting aside the District Court's judgment of December 27, 1961, and dismissing the cause involved therein with prejudice to the plaintiff was filed and granted by the District Court on October 11, 1962. Thereafter, on March 15, 1965, the appellants herein, who have been designated as the Chief Shop Steward and a majority of the duly elected Shop Stewards of the employees of the Appellee-Company[5] filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (b) (6) and sought, inter alia, to set aside the stipulation of October 11, 1962, and to secure the appointment of a Commissioner to enforce the original District Court judgment which was affirmed by this Court on July 6, 1962. The appellants' request for relief was denied by the District Court.

The sole ground relied upon by the appellants for reversal in this appeal is that the District Court erred in allowing a judgment which had been affirmed by an issued mandate of the Court of Appeals to be set aside and the cause of action dismissed without the permission or approval of the appellate court. The appellants have cited two cases in support of their position—**Hartman v. Lauchli**, 304 F. 2d 431 (8th Cir. 1962) and **Thornton v. Carter**, 109 F. 2d 316 (8th Cir. 1940).

While it is true that the cases cited by the appellants support the proposition that a District Court does not have the authority to alter or deviate from a mandate of the Court of Appeals without first obtaining the appel-

[5] The appellants assert that their right to bring this action derives from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71 which provides that "when an order is made in favor of a person who is not a party to the action he may enforce obedience to the order by the same process as if he were a party; and, when obedience to an order may be lawfully enforced against a person who is not a party, he is liable to the same process for enforcing obedience to the order as if he were a party."

late court's consent, the legal principle involved has no application whatsoever to the facts of this case. As previously mentioned in the chronological description of the events which eventually culminated in the instant appeal, this Court specifically noted that the District Court retained jurisdiction of the case for the purpose of carrying out the Stipulation of Subsequent Procedure filed by the parties. After remand of the case, the Appellee-Union and the Appellee-Company entered into a settlement agreement. The fact that the District Court then, upon the request of the parties to the action, dismissed the cause of action with prejudice to the plaintiff in no manner disturbed the mandate of this Court. It is obvious that in affirming the District Court's judgment, this Court recognized the possibility of such a settlement when it stated that "any controversy over backpay allowances can, **if necessary,** be dealt with by the District Court in accordance with the stipulation of the parties relating to implementation of the award." **Selb Mfg. Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists,** *supra* at 179 (emphasis added). It is abundantly clear that the District Court in approving the stipulation dismissing the case acted in conformance with the mandate of this Court. The appeal herein is wholly without merit.

Both appellees herein assert that the appellants' appeal is frivolous and ask for damages and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1912. The Court agrees that the facts of this case render the instant appeal frivolous and that damages should be assessed.[6] Any costs the appellees incurred in connection with the printing of the Record or

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[6] See, **Lowe v. Willacy,** 239 F. 2d 179 (9th Cir. 1956); **Ginsburg v. Stern,** 295 F. 2d 698 (3d Cir. 1961); **Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Eiler,** 126 F. 2d 429 (8th Cir. 1942); Compare **Honebein v. McDonald,** 299 F. 2d 493, 496 (8th Cir. 1962); **Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Davis,** 277 F. 2d 765, 772 (8th Cir. 1960); **Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Feutz,** 182 F. 2d 752, 758-59 (8th Cir. 1950).

the Joint Supplemental Record and the cost of printing appellees' briefs which were necessitated by this appeal are hereby assessed against the appellants. These amounts are to be shown by appellees' affidavits filed with the Clerk of this Court. In addition, appellee-company and appellee-union are awarded $500 each for counsel fees incurred in the appeal. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed and the Clerk of this Court is directed to enter the award of damages upon the showing of appellees' affidavits.

A true copy.

Attest:

Clerk, U. S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Office-Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
SEP 17 1966
JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK

IN THE

# SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

OCTOBER TERM, 1966.

Number 469.

ARCHIE J. LAYTON, ISAAC A. BYRD, JAMES W. BROWN, and JOSEPH R. AINLEY, in Behalf of Themselves and a Committee for and in Behalf of All Other Persons of a Class Similarly Situated,
Petitioners,

vs.

SELB MANUFACTURING COMPANY, a Division of Western, Inc., a Corporation; and BLADES MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, a Corporation, and INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, DISTRICT NO. 9, a Labor Organization,
Respondents.

## BRIEF

**Of Respondents, Selb Manufacturing Company, a Division of Western, Inc., a Corporation, and Blades Manufacturing Corporation, a Corporation, in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari.**

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Respondents.

## BRIEF

**Of Respondents, Selb Manufacturing Company, a Division of Western, Inc., a Corporation, and Blades Manufacturing Corporation, a Corporation, in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari.**

### OPINIONS BELOW.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is reported at 359 Fed. 2d 715. Since Petitioners failed to include such opinion as an appendix to their Petition, these Respondents do so here as Appendix A. The opinion of the District Court is reported at 236 Federal Supplement 451.

### QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

The questions which Petitioners assert are presented in this case are in fact not present because:

(a) Petitioners "Questions Presented" do not reflect the actual facts as shown by the record herein, and

(b) The questions which Petitioners assert are present were not involved nor decided by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

In order to demonstrate the foregoing, and because Petitioners' Statement of Facts is wholly insufficient, Respondents deem it necessary to make their own Statement of the Case, which follows:

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

For convenience, Respondents Selb Manufacturing Company and Blades Manufacturing Corporation will be referred to herein as Respondent-Company and Respondent International Association of Machinists District Number 9 will be referred to as Respondent-Union.[1]

Respondent-Union was the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all production, maintenance and machine shop employees (including Petitioners herein) of Respondent-Company. A grievance was filed by Respondent-Union which ultimately led to an Arbitration Award which ordered Respondent-Company to rehire employees laid off after a certain date, make them whole financially and return machinery and equipment from where they had been shipped to St. Louis.

After the Arbitration Award became final, but was not complied with by the Respondent-Company, Respondent-Union filed suit under Section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C., Section 185, for Specific Performance of said Award. On December 27th, 1961, the

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[1] In addition to Petitioners' record in the Court of Appeals, Respondents filed a Supplemental Record. Therefore, reference to Petitioners' record is made as (R). Reference to Respondents' Supplemental Record is made as (SR).

District Court entered its conclusions of law that the grievance in question was submitted by Respondent-Union and Respondent-Company to arbitration under their contract, and the Arbitration Award became final and binding upon Respondent-Union and Respondent-Company. The District Court then entered its Decree compelling specific performance of the Arbitration Award, and specifically retained jurisdiction for the purpose of carrying out a Stipulation on Subsequent Procedure entered in by the parties.

The Stipulation on Subsequent Procedure was entered into because the Arbitration Award did not declare the names of the employees who were entitled to be reinstated, how much money each such employee was entitled to receive, what machinery and work were to be returned to St. Louis, and because the parties recognized that further proceedings would have to be had in order to determine the foregoing, so that a final judgment on which an execution could issue could be entered.

The Stipulation on Subsequent Procedure provided as follows (S. R. 29):

> "In the event the Court enters its order decreeing specific performance of the Arbitration Award then, and in the event that no appeal is taken, the parties shall attempt to reach agreement on what specifically the defendants must do in order to comply with the aforesaid Arbitration Award. In the event that the parties are unable to reach agreement within thirty days after expiration of the period permitted for appeal, or such additional time as the parties may agree upon, then on application by either party the Court shall appoint a commissioner to implement compliance with the Award.
>
> In the event that either party hereto appeals the finding and order of this Court and/or any appellate

court with respect to whether or not defendants must comply with the arbitration award, the further steps mentioned above shall be held in abeyance pending disposition of said appellate procedure. If it is finally determined, on appeal, that defendants must comply, then the aforesaid procedure shall be followed."

On July 6th, 1962, Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decree of the District Court, and stated that the District Court retained jurisdiction for further proceedings. (**Selb Manufacturing Company v. International Association of Machinists, District 9,** 305 F. 2d 177). On August 29th, 1962, Court of Appeals issued its mandate.

After the decision of the Court of Appeals was handed down, Respondent-Union (as plaintiff) and Respondent-Company (as defendant) engaged in negotiations, looking towards a possible settlement of the case. After consideration and rejection of a number of proposals made by the Company, the Respondent-Union decided to accept in settlement the sum of One Hundred Twenty-five Thousand Dollars ($125,000.00) plus certain re-employment rights (as set forth in the Settlement Agreement of October 11th, 1962, Defendants' Exhibit A-1, S. R. 35-39) (S. R. 41).

A meeting of the employees of the Company was held on September 22nd, 1962, at which Petitioners herein were present. The employees were advised that Respondent-Union had authorized its attorneys to settle the pending litigation for the total amount of One Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($125,000.00) (S. R. 41, R. 54, 55), and then the membership voted that District Number 9, rather than a committee of its members, should process the claims of the employees to determine what portion or amount of the settlement should be received by each of those persons eligible to share in the settlement (R. 28, 35; S. R. 41, 50, 51).

After the September 22nd, 1962, meeting Respondent-Union acting pursuant to the authorization given it by the membership and the District Board (R. 42) entered into the Settlement Agreement and Stipulation (S. R. 35-39). Pursuant to this Agreement the Respondent-Company paid Respondent-Union One Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($125,000.00), which the Union accepted "on its behalf of its members in full and complete satisfaction and settlement of all claims, demands, actions, causes of action and judgment . . ." The agreement further provided that under certain conditions the Company would be required to re-open a plant in St. Louis, and that in any event, if the Company re-opened any plant within the Union's jurisdictional area it would recall the employees in question (S. R. 37, 38).

Upon receipt of the aforesaid One Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($125,000.00), Respondent-Union began processing the claims of the individual members. In the course of processing these claims to determine the amount each eligible employee was entitled to receive the Union sent at least four letters to the employees requesting information relative to their employment in order to determine their eligibility and the amount of their respective claims to the settlement proceedings (S. R. 42-46). The processing of these claims was interrupted because of a protest filed by Petitioner-Layton, and as a result of his objections another meeting of the Union membership was called and took place on March 30th, 1963 (S. R. 39, 40).

At the March 30th, 1963, meeting the officers and counsel of Respondent-Union explained in detail that the aforesaid settlement of the case had been made with the Company, but that any one of the members could file a suit to set aside the settlement. The Union officers and counsel made it perfectly clear that none of the funds received in settlement of the litigation would be disbursed unless everyone present agreed to the settlement and indicated

by his vote that he did not intend to file a suit to contest the settlement (S. R. 48-50, 53, 54, 56).

All of the Petitioners were present at this second meeting and took an active part, particularly Petitioner-Layton who stated he had checked the settlement thoroughly with his committee (S. R. 52). Petitioner Layton also testified in a hearing before the District Court that he had engaged a law firm in February of 1963 to check the court records and said law firm showed copies of the court records to Layton (R. 52, 53).

During discussion of the motion whether to approve the aforesaid settlement that had been made between the Company and the Union, Petitioner Layton asked whether the vote was to be an approval of the entire settlement, or just of the money portion (S. R. 55). It was explained to him and the membership that the proposal they were voting on was whether to approve a settlement of the entire case, not just the money, but jobs and everything (S. R. 55, 56).

At the conclusion of the discussion the Union membership, without objection or a dissenting vote from any of the four Petitioners, unanimously approved and ratified the settlement (S. R. 57).

On June 14th, 1963, pursuant to the approval and ratification of the settlement by the membership, and after determining the persons eligible to share in the settlement proceeds and the amount to which each such employee was entitled, as it had been authorized to do by the membership, the Union sent out letters to the employees entitled to share in the proceeds of the settlement, each of which letters contained the following statement (R. 12):

> "Enclosed please find check in the amount of $...., which represents payment in full of your claim

against Selb Manufacturing Company and Blades Manufacturing Corporation pursuant to the Settlement Agreement entered into in the case of **I A of M District 9 versus Selb Manufacturing Company and Blades Manufacturing Corporation** No. 61 C 20 (1) in the United States District Court for the Eastern Judicial District of Missouri, Eastern Division . . ."

Enclosed with each letter was a check to the respective employees, including Petitioners herein (S. R. 58).

On the back of each of the checks there was the following stamped release (S. R. 61):

"Endorsement constitutes full and complete satisfaction and settlement of my claims arising out of Cause No. 61 C 20 (1), in the U. S. District Court for the Eastern Judicial District of Missouri, Eastern Division, styled **International Association of Machinists, District 9 versus Selb Manufacturing Company et al.**, and a full and complete Release of the above mentioned parties, the I A of M District 9 Welfare Association and their officers, agents and employees."

Each of the above checks received by the Petitioners was endorsed by them below the stamped release. At the hearing on the Motion each of them admitted endorsing the check and receiving the money (R. 57, 69, 71, 74).

On March 15th, 1965, after a lapse of almost 2½ years, Petitioners filed their motion under Rule 60 (b) (6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, seeking to set aside the order of the District Court dismissing this case pursuant to the settlement previously made. The District Court gave Petitioners a full hearing on their Motion.

## DISTRICT COURT FINDINGS.

Based upon the foregoing facts, the District Court overruled Petitioners' Motion herein and in addition to finding essentially the foregoing facts (R. 79), found that the Petitioners had full and complete knowledge of the settlement; that the Union that brought the arbitration was responsible for obtaining the relief and was the proper representative of all of the employees (R. 82); that the Union and Company had the right to settle the litigation without leave of the Court of Appeals (R. 83) and that in any event the facts showed clearly that the Petitioners had full knowledge of the settlement made by the Union and they were barred from proceeding by acceptance of the money and the signing of the Releases (R. 84).

## COURT OF APPEALS FINDINGS.

In affirming the District Court, the Court of Appeals noted that sole ground relied upon by Petitioners in their appeal was that the District Court erred in allowing a judgment which had been affirmed to be set aside and dismissed without permission or approval of the Appellate Court contrary to the holdings in its cases of **Hartman v. Lauchli,** 304 F. 2d 431 (8th Cir. 1962) and **Thornton v. Carter,** 109 F. 2d 316 (8th Cir. 1940). In disposing of this contention the Court of Appeals pointed out that the legal principle involved in those cases had no application whatsoever to the facts in this case. The Court of Appeals specifically pointed out that the District Court retained jurisdiction for the purposes of carrying out the Stipulation on Subsequent Procedure and that it had recognized the possibility of a settlement when it stated in its affirming opinion that "any controversy over backpay allowances can, **if necessary,** be dealt with by the District Court in accordance with the Stipulation of the parties relating to implementation of the award."

Thus, the Court of Appeals, in interpreting its own mandate, found that the parties did **not** violate its mandate, but in fact acted in conformance with it, and this was the sole ground raised by Petitioners and the sole stated ground on which the Court of Appeals affirmed.

In addition to holding Petitioners' appeal to be wholly without merit, the Court of Appeals found that, under the facts, the Petitioners' appeal was frivolous and assessed damages against them.

## ARGUMENT AGAINST GRANTING CERTIORARI.

In support of their Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Petitioners urge and refer this Court to the arguments they made in their Petition for Re-hearing filed in the Court of Appeals. Looking to that document, Respondents find no reasons advanced of such moment that it would compel this Court to grant Certiorari, much less any of the reasons suggested by this Court under its Rule 19. The most that can be said of Petitioners' argument is that they seem to be taking the remarkable position of asserting that the Court of Appeals misinterpreted its own mandate and opinion.

This being the case, Respondents submit that, under any reasonable or accepted standard, the present record does not reflect any persuasive reason why the Court should hear this case.

To begin with, the questions which the Petitioners state are present here are, in fact, not present at all. The basic reason for this is that the questions, as posed, assume facts which do not appear in and are not based on the record. Specifically, Question "A" states that the "membership involved has revoked the settlement authority." This statement is wholly inaccurate, and Respondents were compelled to make a rather detailed Statement of the Case in order to show clearly the err of this assertion. Merely a cursory reading of Respondents' Statement of

the Case and the record is sufficient to demonstrate this err and inaccuracy. It is crystal clear from the record that the membership did approve the settlement and did ratify the same, with full knowledge of its terms. Furthermore, they accepted all the benefits of the settlement and enjoyed these benefits for almost two and a half years before Petitioners filed their Motion under 60 (b) (6); the Motion which initiated these proceedings. These were the facts found by the District Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Since the Petitioners' assumed facts are incorrect, the question based thereon is specious, and in fact the question as framed presents no real question at all.

Question "B" also presents an issue which has no real meaning here.

Petitioners, in this question, ask whether an appellate court can allow its mandate to be changed without its consent. The answer, given by the best available source—the appellate court that issued the mandate—is that the mandate in question here was not altered nor changed and thus, the question is irrelevant. As stated by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit:

> "As previously mentioned in the chronological description of the event which eventually culminated in the instant appeal, this Court specifically noted that the District Court retained jurisdiction of the case for the purpose of carrying out the Stipulation of Subsequent Procedure filed by the parties. After remand of the case, the Appellee-Union and the Appellee-Company entered into a settlement agreement. The fact that the District Court then, upon the request of the parties to the action, dismissed the cause of action with prejudice to the plaintiff in no manner disturbed the mandate of this Court. It is obvious that in affirming the District Court's judgment, this

> Court recognized the possibility of such a settlement when it stated that 'any controversy over backpay allowances can, **if necessary**, be dealt with by the District Court in accordance with the stipulation of the parties relating to implementation of the award.' **Selb Manufacturing Company v. International Association of Machinists**, *supra*, at 179. It is abundantly clear that the District Court in approving the stipulation dismissing the case acted in conformance with the mandate of this Court. The appeal herein is wholly without merit.''

The Court also considered the cases again cited here by Petitioners and found the teachings of those cases inapplicable, since their facts were clearly distinguishable from the present case. Clearly, Petitioners' Question "B" presents nothing for this Court to consider.

The last question, Question "C", claimed to be present is likewise not present, since it is nothing more than a rephrasing of Question "A" and is, like Question "A", also contrary to the facts.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the questions posed by Petitioners raise non-existent issues, since they are questions based upon facts erroneously assumed and stated; hence, no real issue is presented for this Court to decide.

In addition, a search of the record fails to disclose any factual, substantive or procedural error requiring that Court to grant Certiorari. Since no real issues are raised, it is obvious that issues of sufficient importance to be considered by this Court are not raised. Nor has there been any showing of a conflict in the opinions between the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit with its own opinions, or with the opinions of other Circuit Court of Appeals, or with opinions of this Court.

Respondents also point out that the judgment of the Court of Appeals was manifestly correct and for the

right parties. The facts of the entire proceedings, considered by the District Court and the Court of Appeals, give rise to a number of valid defenses that bar Petitioners from relief in any event. These were presented by Respondents below and Respondents do not consider it appropriate to set forth these additional defenses here. Respondents, however, do point out that Petitioners were afforded a full and fair hearing in the District Court and the Court of Appeals, and Petitioners' only argument appears to be that the Court of Appeals misinterpreted its own mandate, previously issued by that Court, even though that Court made it perfectly clear that everything done by the parties was well within what the Court intended and contemplated.

In short, Petitioners advance no reasons even resembling those reasons of the character which Supreme Court Rule 19 states will be considered for granting of review on certiorari.

## CONCLUSION.

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

BERNARD A. BARKEN, and

J. LEONARD SCHERMER,
611 Olive Street, Suite 1510,
St. Louis, Missouri 63101,
Area Code 314,
CHestnut 1-0202,
Attorneys for Respondents, Selb Manufacturing Company, a Division of Western, Inc., a Corporation, and Blades Manufacturing Corporation, a Corporation.

September, 1966.

## APPENDIX A.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit.

No. 18,168

Archie J. Layton, Isaac A. Byrd, James W. Brown, and Joseph R. Ainley, In Behalf of Themselves and as a Committee for and in Behalf of All Other Persons of a Class Similarly Situated,
Appellants,

vs.

Selb Manufacturing Company, a Division of Western, Inc., a Corporation, and Blades Manufacturing Corporation, a Corporation, International Association of Machinists, District 9,
Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.

[May 2, 1966.]

Before Vogel, Chief Judge, Blackmun, Circuit Judge, and Stephenson, District Judge.

Stephenson, District Judge.

This is an appeal from the District Court's order[1] denying appellants' motion[2] seeking to enforce a previous

[1] **Layton v. Selb Mfg. Co.**, 244 F. Supp. 178 (E. D. Mo. 1965).

[2] The appellants' motion was made pursuant to the provision of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60 (b) (6) which provides: "On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final order,

judgment which had been set aside and the cause therein dismissed by the District Court upon stipulation of the parties after said judgment had been affirmed by this Court.

An arbitration award ordering Selb Manufacturing Company and Blades Manufacturing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Appellee-Company) to rehire certain employees, to make these employees whole financially, and to return certain equipment and work to St. Louis was obtained on January 5, 1961, by the International Association of Machinists, District No. 9 (hereinafter referred to as Appellee-Union). On February 10, 1961, the Appellee-Union and the Appellee-Company entered into a stipulation providing for the procedure to be followed if and when the Federal District Court ordered specific enforcement of the arbitration award.[3]

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judgment or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this sub-division (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as provided in Title 28, U. S. C., 1655, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action."

[3] The stipulation on subsequent procedure entered into by the Appellee-Union and the Appellee-Company was as follows:

"In the event the Court enters its order decreeing specific performance of the Arbitration Award then, and in the event that no appeal is taken, the parties shall attempt to reach agreement on what specifically the defendants must do in order to comply with the aforesaid Arbitration Award. In the event that the parties are unable to reach agreement within thirty days after expiration of the period permitted for appeal, or such additional time as the parties may agree upon, then on

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri entered an order on December 27, 1961, compelling specific performance of the arbitration award and further noted that "this Court will retain jurisdiction of this cause for the purpose of carrying out the Stipulation on Subsequent Procedure filed by the parties herein." The judgment of the District Court was affirmed on July 6, 1962. **Selb Mfg. Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists**, 305 F. 2d 177 (8th Cir. 1962). In affirming the District Court's judgment this Court, after observing that a stipulation between the parties had been filed, noted that, if necessary, the District Court could deal with any controversies concerning the stipulation of the parties relating to implementation of the award. After this Court issued its mandate on August 29, 1962, settlement negotiations between the Appellee-Union and Appellee-Company resulted in a $125,000 payment to the Union in satisfaction of the Union claims and demands giving rise to the arbitration award.[4] The document embodying this agreement included a paragraph stating that "the Company will take whatever steps are necessary to withdraw further prosecution of its appeal and application for certiorari, and the Union will dismiss with prejudice at the cost of the Company Cause No. 61 C 20 (1) now pending in the

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application by either party the Court shall appoint a commissioner to implement compliance with the Award.

In the event that either party hereto appeals the finding and order of this Court and/or any appellate court with respect to whether or not defendants must comply with the arbitration award, the further steps mentioned above shall be held in abeyance pending disposition of said appellate procedure. If it is finally determined, on appeal, that defendants must comply, then the aforesaid procedure shall be followed."

[4] After discussion and action taken at two union meetings, Appellee-Union made distribution of the settlement to its members, including named appellants, who received and endorsed individual checks acknowledging full and complete settlement and satisfaction of their respective claims and a release of appellees. 244 F. Supp. at 179-80.

District Court of the Eastern Judicial District of Missouri." A stipulation by the parties setting aside the District Court's judgment of December 27, 1961, and dismissing the cause involved therein with prejudice to the plaintiff was filed and granted by the District Court on October 11, 1962. Thereafter, on March 15, 1965, the appellants herein, who have been designated as the Chief Shop Steward and a majority of the duly elected Shop Stewards of the employees of the Appellee-Company[5] filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (b) (6) and sought, inter alia, to set aside the stipulation of October 11, 1962, and to secure the appointment of a Commissioner to enforce the original District Court judgment which was affirmed by this Court on July 6, 1962. The appellants' request for relief was denied by the District Court.

The sole ground relied upon by the appellants for reversal in this appeal is that the District Court erred in allowing a judgment which had been affirmed by an issued mandate of the Court of Appeals to be set aside and the cause of action dismissed without the permission or approval of the appellate court. The appellants have cited two cases in support of their position—**Hartman v. Lauchli,** 304 F. 2d 431 (8th Cir. 1962) and **Thornton v. Carter,** 109 F. 2d 316 (8th Cir. 1940).

While it is true that the cases cited by the appellants support the proposition that a District Court does not have the authority to alter or deviate from a mandate of the Court of Appeals without first obtaining the appel-

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[5] The appellants assert that their right to bring this action derives from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71 which provides that "when an order is made in favor of a person who is not a party to the action he may enforce obedience to the order by the same process as if he were a party; and, when obedience to an order may be lawfully enforced against a person who is not a party, he is liable to the same process for enforcing obedience to the order as if he were a party."

late court's consent, the legal principle involved has no application whatsoever to the facts of this case. As previously mentioned in the chronological description of the events which eventually culminated in the instant appeal, this Court specifically noted that the District Court retained jurisdiction of the case for the purpose of carrying out the Stipulation of Subsequent Procedure filed by the parties. After remand of the case, the Appellee-Union and the Appellee-Company entered into a settlement agreement. The fact that the District Court then, upon the request of the parties to the action, dismissed the cause of action with prejudice to the plaintiff in no manner disturbed the mandate of this Court. It is obvious that in affirming the District Court's judgment, this Court recognized the possibility of such a settlement when it stated that "any controversy over backpay allowances can, **if necessary**, be dealt with by the District Court in accordance with the stipulation of the parties relating to implementation of the award." **Selb Mfg. Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists**, *supra* at 179 (emphasis added). It is abundantly clear that the District Court in approving the stipulation dismissing the case acted in conformance with the mandate of this Court. The appeal herein is wholly without merit.

Both appellees herein assert that the appellants' appeal is frivolous and ask for damages and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1912. The Court agrees that the facts of this case render the instant appeal frivolous and that damages should be assessed.[6] Any costs the appellees incurred in connection with the printing of the Record or

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[6] See, **Lowe v. Willacy**, 239 F. 2d 179 (9th Cir. 1956); **Ginsburg v. Stern**, 295 F. 2d 698 (3d Cir. 1961); **Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Eiler**, 126 F. 2d 429 (8th Cir. 1942); Compare **Honebein v. McDonald**, 299 F. 2d 493, 496 (8th Cir. 1962); **Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Davis**, 277 F. 2d 765, 772 (8th Cir. 1960); **Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Feutz**, 182 F. 2d 752, 758-59 (8th Cir. 1950).

the Joint Supplemental Record and the cost of printing appellees' briefs which were necessitated by this appeal are hereby assessed against the appellants. These amounts are to be shown by appellees' affidavits filed with the Clerk of this Court. In addition, appellee-company and appellee-union are awarded $500 each for counsel fees incurred in the appeal. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed and the Clerk of this Court is directed to enter the award of damages upon the showing of appellees' affidavits.

A true copy.

Attest:

Clerk, U. S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

# PETITION FOR REHEARING OF ORDER

FILED
DEC 1 1966
JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK

IN THE

# SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

OCTOBER TERM, 1966.

No. 469.

ARCHIE J. LAYTON, ISAAC A. BYRD, JAMES W. BROWN and JOSEPH R. AINLEY, in Behalf of Themselves and a Committee for and in Behalf of All Other Persons of a Class Similarly Situated,
Petitioners,

vs.

SELB MANUFACTURING COMPANY, a Division of Western, Inc., a Corporation, and BLADES MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, a Corporation, and INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS DISTRICT NO. 9, a Labor Organization, Appellees,
Respondents.

## PETITION FOR REHEARING OF ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

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314—MAin 1-3833,
Attorney for Petitioners.

ST. LOUIS LAW PRINTING CO., INC., 415 N. Eighth Street. CEntral 1-4477.

IN THE

# SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

OCTOBER TERM, 1966.

No. 469.

ARCHIE J. LAYTON, ISAAC A. BYRD, JAMES W. BROWN and JOSEPH R. AINLEY, in Behalf of Themselves and a Committee for and in Behalf of All Other Persons of a Class Similarly Situated, Petitioners,

vs.

SELB MANUFACTURING COMPANY, a Division of Western, Inc., a Corporation, and BLADES MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, a Corporation, and INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS DISTRICT NO. 9, a Labor Organization, Appellees, Respondents.

## PETITION FOR REHEARING OF ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

The petitioners herein (the Chief Shop Steward and a majority of the Shop Stewards of an employee unit of the respondent Company) pray this Court to grant a rehearing of its order of November 7th, 1966, denying these petitioners a writ of certiorari, 87 S. Ct. ... (1966), and that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit as prayed in the petition for certiorari filed herein on August 23rd, 1966.

## REASONS FOR GRANTING REHEARING AND ISSUING THE WRIT.

1. Chief Judge Vogel and Judges Blackmun and Stephenson (District Judge), in an opinion by District Judge Stephenson found the appeal herein to be frivolous and assessed damages against these petitioners which will approximate $2,000.00 (Appendix "A" to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, opinion of Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, pages 5, 6 and 7).

2. An order and money judgment of this nature, without notice, without a hearing, without any indication that the district judge below found the original Rule 60 (b) (6) motion to be devoid of merit; and, finally without any clue or comment hinting at such an attitude from the Court of Appeals in the course of the argument of counsel during the submission of the appeal to the three Judges assigned to hear this appeal is a flagrant denial of the right of due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

3. The petition of these Union Shop Stewards under the provisions of Rule 60 (b) (6) (R. 6 to 9) prayed that the "Stipulation" of dismissal (R. 10) be set aside because this dismissal was violative of the mandate of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals (Prayer of petition, R. 8 and 9). Petitioners urge this Court to consider that this abortive "Stipulation" (R. 10), set aside the "judgment and decree entered by" the District Court "on December 27, 1961." The stipulation never mentions or even alludes to the fact that the Court of Appeals had entered its Mandate in that same file on August 30th, 1962, (Docket entries, U. S. District Court, R. 3). This Mandate and its affirming provisions, orders and judgments were never "set aside" and remain as binding and enforceable today as it was on August 30th, 1962. These petitioners need the authority of this Court "upon such terms as are

just" (Rule 60 (b) (6)) to allow them to enjoy the benefits of their arbitration award.

4. Rule 60 (b) (6) allows a District Court "to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court." Underneath the mountain of abuse which has been shovelled onto these petitioners one fact remains crystal clear and uncontroverted: these union members were never advised in any respect of the terms and provisions of the "agreement" (J. S. R. 35, 36, 37, 38 and 39) entered into and executed by the respondent Union official and Company official on the same day that they executed and filed the abortive "Stipulation." This agreement was **never** filed with either the District Court or the Court of Appeals nor was it ever made known to these petitioners until **after** they filed their Rule 60 (b) (6) motion (R. 67, 70, 72). This "Agreement" re-wrote the Arbitrator's Award without his knowledge or consent; re-wrote the orders and judgment of the District Court Judge without his knowledge or consent; re-wrote the Mandate of the Court of Appeals without its knowledge or consent and finally it re-wrote the rights and benefits awarded to these petitioners without their knowledge or consent. **This is fraud!!!** Fraud upon an Arbitrator, two Courts and upon the rights of the employee-union members in whose behalf this entire proceeding was instituted. It is fraud by a labor union official in breach of his fiduciary duty to his captive members.

In the course of adjudicating this Rule 60 (b) (6) motion thus far this unassailable fact of fraud has never been mentioned. In retrospect it becomes the single most important factor in this entire case. Petitioners pray now that this Court re-consider its order refusing to issue its Writ of Certiorari, and correct the repeated denial of justice which has been the lot of these petitioners thus far.

## CONCLUSION.

For the reasons set forth herein and in the petition for writ of certiorari it is respectfully urged that rehearing be granted and that, upon such re-hearing, a writ of certiorari issue to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

.....

JEROME J. DUFF,
Counsel for Petitioners.

### Certificate of Counsel.

I hereby certify that the foregoing petition for rehearing is presented in good faith and not for delay and is restricted to grounds specified in Rule 58 of the rules of this Court.

.....

Jerome J. Duff,
Counsel for Petitioners.

### Certificate of Service.

State of Missouri,
City of St. Louis. } ss.

I, Jerome J. Duff, of counsel for the Petitioners herein and attorney of record for the Petitioners in the Court below, depose that on the 30 day of November, 1966, I served four copies of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing on the Respondents as required by Rule 33, Paragraph 1, by personally mailing said copies hereof to Mr. Bernard Barken, Attorney of Record for Respondent Company,

611 Olive Street, St. Louis, Missouri 63101, and Messrs. Bartley, Siegel and Bartley, Attorneys for Respondent Union, 130 South Bemiston Avenue, Clayton, Missouri 63105.

.....

Jerome J. Duff.

Subscribed and sworn to before me at St. Louis, Missouri, on this .... day of November, 1960.

.....

Notary Public.

My Commission Expires:

.....